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In this paper, I present an interpretation of Descartes that deemphasizes his skepticism. I 
analyze a selection of remarks from Descartes’ correspondence in which he makes judgments about 
the skeptics. I argue that such remarks display Descartes’ attitude of contempt for skeptical 
philosophy. Since Descartes associates the skeptics with the activity of constant and total doubting 
and yet presents scenarios that seemingly arise from extreme doubt—like the malicious demon 
hypothesis—I look at what Descartes says in the correspondence about his own use of doubt in his 
published works. Descartes distances himself from the skeptics because he claims that whereas they 
doubt everything and, in so doing, act heretically, he uses doubt for a noble purpose. I suggest that 
although Descartes is influenced by skeptical ideas and considers skeptical argumentation to be 
useful, his strategic use of such argumentation should not lead us to believe that he condones 
skepticism. Quite the contrary, most of his remarks on the subject show that Descartes is highly 
critical or dismissive of skeptical ideas. Therefore, I argue that it is more accurate to characterize 
Descartes as a philosopher generally opposed to skepticism. 
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The opening line of Bernard Williams’ essay, “Descartes’s Use of Skepticism,” reads, 
“Descartes was not a skeptic. One has to take a distant and inaccurate view of his writings to suppose 
that he was.” (Williams 1983, 337) I agree with Williams. Descartes was not a skeptic. However, 
though he acknowledges that Descartes was not a skeptic, Williams believes that skepticism was of 
fundamental importance to both Descartes’ reasoning and his philosophical approach. Skepticism, 
Williams says, was first “the extreme dramatization of uncertainty, an uncertainty which, largely 
independent of any philosophical discipline or exercise, already existed, and which Descartes felt he 
had to confront. It was, second, part of his method for overcoming uncertainty and attaining 
knowledge.” (Williams 1983, 338) 
There are many Cartesian scholars and historians of early modern philosophy who accentuate 
the role of skepticism in Descartes’ thought. For example, in his classic book on early modern 
philosophy, The History of Scepticism, Richard Popkin argues that Descartes realized the danger of 
skepticism “to the cause of both science and religion” and, as a result, attempted to “set in motion 
Humanities Bulletin, Volume 2, Number 1, 2019 
 
72 
his philosophical revolution by discovering something ‘so certain and so assured that all the most 
extravagant suppositions brought forward by the sceptics were incapable of shaking it.’” (Popkin 
2003, 144–145) Popkin argues that Descartes was deeply concerned with skepticism and, in fact, 
that his philosophical project was primarily motivated by a skeptical threat.  
It is understandable that Descartes’ skepticism should be a topic of such pronounced scholarly 
engagement. Descartes’ skeptical method of doubt in the First Meditation is often viewed as having 
been revolutionary for its time—a highly original means of turning inwards in order to arrive at the 
discovery of a self-evident and internally intuited first principle of philosophy (the cogito). Cartesian 
scholar Roger Ariew questions the historical accuracy of such an account. Through an exposition 
and an analysis of the writings of two other well-known seventeenth-century thinkers, Jean de Silhon 
and Antoine Sirmond—both of whom also make use of cogitos in their works—Ariew shows this 
type of portrayal of Descartes to be misleading. “That image of Descartes,” he says, “does not mesh 
very well with some of what Descartes says about the cogito or with the reality of the reception of his 
philosophy in the seventeenth century.” (Ariew 2011, 313) Ariew argues that most of the 
seventeenth-century critiques of Descartes focus on his metaphysical claims and their 
incompatibility with Scholastic and Aristotelian principles as well as Church doctrines. Even so, 
Ariew is perfectly aware of the current and prevalent view that Descartes’ philosophical endeavors 
are closely connected to skepticism. He says, “Descartes’ attempt to answer the skeptic by 
establishing that he exists as a thinking thing is often considered emblematic of modern philosophy.” 
(Ariew 2011, 312) 
In her article, “Descartes and Skepticism,” Marjorie Grene points to the numerous differences 
between Descartes and the ancient skeptics in order to argue that Descartes was not a skeptic. Yet, 
Grene also recognizes the tendency for today’s philosophers to associate Descartes with skepticism. 
“The hyperbolical doubt of the First Meditation,” she says, “is often taken for the epitome of 
skepticism.” (Grene 1999, 553) I argue that too much is made of Descartes’ skepticism, but it is 
apparent that Descartes was influenced by skeptical ideas. To say otherwise would exhibit a 
misinformed view of his writings. Descartes utilizes hyperbolic doubt in the First Meditation, and 
he uses skeptical arguments and reasoning in both the Discourse on Method and the Principles of 
Philosophy. I would suggest that in the Discourse he echoes the language of Michel de Montaigne, 
who was well known during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for his skeptical writings, and 
the ideas of both Sextus Empiricus, a Greek Pyrrhonist from the second century A.D., and Cicero, 
a Roman Academic philosopher from the first century B.C. 
 
Montaigne, Sextus, and Cicero in the Discourse on Method 
It is not my view that Michel de Montaigne was a skeptic. Although Montaigne praises the 
intellectual attitude of the Pyrrhonists in his essay, the Apology for Raymond Sebond, such 
admiration does not justify characterizing him as a Pyrrhonist or as a skeptic. Some of Montaigne’s 
motivations are non-skeptical. Much of his writing in the Apology is intended to admonish man for 
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his intellectual arrogance and to point him towards faith in, and reliance on, God. In addition, many 
of Montaigne’s Essays aside from the Apology point to the influences of non-skeptical traditions, 
including Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Christianity.1 Nevertheless, Montaigne was known in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for his use of skeptical reasoning in the Apology and, insofar as 
his discussions about—and approval of—Pyrrhonism in that work are concerned, we can say that 
he was certainly influenced by skeptical ideas. 
There are no clear-cut or foolproof indications from Descartes’ writings to support this view, 
but I would suggest that in the beginning of the Discourse on Method, Descartes’ choice of words 
demonstrates the impression made on him by the writings of Montaigne.2 He opens the Discourse 
with the following reflections: “Good sense is the best distributed thing in the world, for everyone 
thinks himself to be so well endowed with it that even those who are the most difficult to please in 
everything else are not at all wont to desire more of it than they have.” (Descartes 2000, 46) Compare 
this to what Montaigne says in his essay, On presumption: “It is commonly held that good sense is 
the gift which Nature has most fairly shared among us, for there is nobody who is not satisfied with 
what Nature has allotted him.” (Montaigne 2003, 746) There is no hint of skeptical reasoning in 
either of these statements, but Descartes’ phraseology is strikingly similar to that of Montaigne, and 
it seems to suggest Montaigne’s influence on him. 
In Part Three of the Discourse, Descartes explains the reasons why, in practical life, he chose 
to live by a certain “provisional code of morals,” the first two maxims of which, respectively, are 
quite similar to some of Sextus Empiricus’ statements from the Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Cicero’s 
remarks in the Academica. (Descartes 2000, 56) In Part One of the Discourse, Descartes explains the 
specific method he had used “to conduct his reason well” as well as his delimiting of that method to 
the search for—and attainment of—scientific and philosophical truth. (Descartes 2000, 47) Where 
such kinds of truth are concerned, Descartes argues that only certain knowledge is acceptable and 
that there can be no room for opinions or probabilistic reasoning. “Concerning philosophy,” 
Descartes states, “considering how many opinions there can be about the very same matter that are 
held by learned people without there ever being the possibility of more than one opinion being true, 
I deemed everything that was merely probable to be well night false.” (Descartes 2000, 49) However, 
while he shunned probability, accepted only certain knowledge, and diligently practiced his method 
in search of philosophical truth, in everyday life Descartes says that he chose to settle on probabilistic 
reasoning and follow commonly accepted opinions. 
Descartes describes the pragmatic reasons for his decision to adhere to a provisional code of 
morals while pursuing philosophical truth. “In order not to remain irresolute in my actions,” he 
explains, “while reason required me to be so in my judgments, and in order not to cease to live as 
happily as possible during this time, I formulated a provisional code of morals, which consisted of 
but three or four maxims.” (Descartes 2000, 56) The first of these maxims is “to obey the laws and 
customs of my country, constantly holding on to the religion in which, by God’s grace, I had been 
instructed from my childhood, and governing myself in everything else according to the most 
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moderate opinions and those furthest from excess—opinions that were commonly accepted in 
practice by the most judicious of those with whom I would have to live.” (Descartes 2000, 56) 
Compare Descartes’ first maxim to Sextus’ description of how the ancient Pyrrhonian skeptics chose 
to live according to the customs and laws handed down to them: “Attending to what is apparent, we 
live in accordance with everyday observances, without holding opinions – for we are not able to be 
utterly inactive. These everyday observances seem to be fourfold and to consist in guidance by 
nature, necessitation by feelings, handing down of laws and customs, and teaching kinds of 
expertise.” (Sextus 2000, 9) Just as Descartes governed himself in public life according to commonly 
accepted opinions, the Pyrrhonists followed, “by the handing down of customs and laws…from an 
everyday point of view,” common opinions including, for instance, the opinion that “piety is good 
and impiety bad.” (Sextus 2000, 9) 
Descartes’ second maxim of his provisional morality is “to be as firm and resolute in my actions 
as I could, and to follow the most doubtful opinions, once I had decided on them, with no less 
constancy than if they had been very well assured.” (Descartes 2000, 57) With regard to how he 
would practice this rule in his practical life, Descartes expounds on and defends his decision to rely 
on probabilistic reasoning. He says, “And thus the actions of life often tolerating no delay, it is a very 
certain truth that, when it is not in our power to discern the truest opinions, we must follow the 
most probable; and even if we notice no more probability in some than in others, nevertheless we 
must settle on some, and afterwards no longer regard them as doubtful, insofar as they relate to 
practical matters, but as very true and very certain, because the reason that made us decide on them 
appears so.” (Descartes 2000, 57) Parallels can be drawn between the reliance on probability 
encouraged by Descartes’ second maxim and the views of the Academic skeptics described by Cicero 
in his Academica. Cicero characterizes the Academic philosophers as remaining firm in their 
conviction “that nothing is apprehensible” and yet also admitting that some accounts or arguments 
seem more likely than others. (Cicero 2006, 40) “While there are no impressions allowing for 
apprehension,” Cicero says, “there are many allowing for approval. It would be contrary to nature 
were there no persuasive impressions.” (Cicero 2006, 58) Though they deny their ability to know 
with certainty the truth of accounts or arguments, the Academic skeptics approve of or assent to 
them based on persuasiveness or probabilistic reasoning.  
In addition to these commonalities between Descartes and the skeptics, it can be argued that 
both Descartes and the Pyrrhonists are aligned in their desired goal: tranquility. For the Pyrrhonists, 
there can be no doubt that the end or aim of their pursuits is tranquility. Sextus says that such peace 
of mind, or ataraxia, is that for the sake of which the Pyrrhonists philosophize in a particular 
manner: “The causal principle [of Pyrrhonism] we say is the hope of becoming tranquil.” (Sextus 
2000, 5) In Part Six of the Discourse, Descartes describes tranquility as that which he “esteem(s) 
above all things.” (Descartes 2000, 80) However, Descartes and the Pyrrhonists hold different views 
concerning what leads to tranquility. The Pyrrhonists argue that equipollence and the suspension 
of judgment naturally lead us to tranquility whereas Descartes says that the “perfect peace of mind I 
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am seeking” can possibly be attained through his forthrightness with the public about the 
motivations for his philosophical work. (Descartes 2000, 80) Of course, whereas the Pyrrhonists 
posit tranquility as their ultimate goal, there are many places in Descartes’ writings that show he had 
several different goals in his philosophical and scientific pursuits. For example, in a letter to the 
Marquess of Newcastle, from October of 1645, Descartes says, “The preservation of health has 
always been the principal end of my studies.” (Descartes 1991, 275) Additionally, it goes without 
saying that Descartes often repeats the refrain of a desire to seek after and attain truth above all else. 
There are similarities between Descartes, on the one hand, and both the Pyrrhonian skeptics 
and the Academic skeptics, on the other. Descartes’ provisional morality hearkens back to the 
attitudes of both the Pyrrhonists, as evidenced by Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines, and the Academics, 
as understood through Cicero’s Academica. In addition, although they held different views about 
what exactly would lead to it, both Descartes and the Pyrrhonian skeptics sought after tranquility. 
Besides the Discourse, Descartes’ other published works, including the Meditations and the 
Principles of Philosophy, present skeptical arguments that remind us of some of the characteristic 
Pyrrhonian “modes” of reasoning.3 For example, in the Third Meditation, in order to challenge our 
claims to knowledge based on the senses, Descartes compares our two ways of thinking about the 
size of the sun. He argues that whereas our sense perception (in this case, eyesight) shows us that the 
sun is of approximately one size, astronomical reasoning reveals the sun to be, in fact, much larger.4 
In the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus also presents arguments to show how our senses are inadequate 
for providing us with certain knowledge. However, Sextus’ views in this regard are different from 
those of Descartes. Concerning objects in the world, including the sun, and how they appear to us, 
Sextus says, “We shall be able to say what the existing objects are like as observed by us, but as to 
what they are like in their nature, we shall suspend judgment.” (Sextus 2000, 17) Although there is 
common ground between Descartes and the skeptics, it can only indicate so much when it comes to 
the influence of skepticism on Descartes’ thought. 
The instances of a skeptical reasoning and argumentation in Descartes’ writings do not 
provide adequate or sufficient evidence to claim that Descartes held a favorable view of the skeptics. 
Nor do such skeptical marks in his works imply that Descartes was seriously concerned with 
skepticism. The respective projects of Descartes, on the one hand, and both the Pyrrhonian skeptics 
and the Academic skeptics, on the other, are patently dissimilar. Whereas the Pyrrhonists and the 
Academics provide particular modes of reasoning that display our ignorance about claims to 
knowledge, Descartes presents skeptical arguments to show that the senses are deceptive but that the 
understanding—when properly utilized—is more reliable than sense perception for acquiring 
knowledge. In fact, Descartes argues not only that certain knowledge can be attained, but also that 
he has attained it. Unlike the Pyrrhonists, who suggest that equipollence and the suspension of 
judgment—both of which result in reaffirming our ignorance—lead to tranquility, Descartes 
suggests only that frankness with the public about the motivations for his philosophical project 
might bring about such peace of mind. The Pyrrhonian skeptics lived in accordance with the 
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customs and laws handed down to them, but they did so because despite the fact that they were 
unwilling and apparently unable to make claims to knowledge about anything, they were “not able 
to be utterly inactive.” (Sextus 2000, 9) Descartes’ provisional code of morals, which is similar in 
spirit to some aspects of the Pyrrhonian and Academic ways of life, helped him to live day to day “as 
happily as possible” by accepting the most moderate and most commonly accepted social customs. 
(Descartes 2000, 56) Yet, unlike the Pyrrhonian skeptics, he lived in this manner while practicing a 
method of philosophical inquiry that would in fact lead him to certain knowledge.  
 
Descartes’ Views on Skepticism: The Correspondence 
Descartes mentions skepticism several times in his correspondence. He discusses doubt even 
more. Based on the indications from his writings, Descartes seems to have believed that the activity 
of doubting was the primary characteristic of skepticism. In the Discourse, he distinguishes his 
method and his goals from what he considered to be those of the skeptics. Descartes says, “I…rooted 
out from my mind all the errors that had previously been able to slip into it. Not that, in order to do 
this, I was imitating the skeptics who doubt merely for the sake of doubting and put on the 
affectation of being perpetually undecided; for, on the contrary, my entire plan tended simply to 
give me assurance and to cast aside the shifting earth and sand in order to find the rock or clay.” 
(Descartes 2000, 59) 
In a letter to Hyperaspistes from August 1641, Descartes explains why his use of a particular 
kind of hyperbolic doubt precludes him from being called a skeptic, and he both characterizes the 
skeptics as doubting everything and criticizes them for doing so disingenuously: “You cannot have a 
sceptic saying, ‘Let the evil demon deceive me as much as he can,’ because anyone who says this is by 
that token not a sceptic since he does not doubt everything…It is only in name, and perhaps in 
intention and resolve, that [the skeptics] adhere to their heresy of doubting everything.” (Descartes 
1991, 196–197) These examples reveal Descartes’ view that skepticism is typified by incessant and 
total doubting as well as his desire to distance or disassociate himself from the skeptics. Instead of 
examining every reference to skepticism or doubt in Descartes’ correspondence, in the following 
sections I will focus on statements Descartes makes that carry judgments about the skeptics, 
skepticism, and the use of doubt. In so doing, I will show how Descartes’ stated views reveal that he 
had a dismissive and contemptuous attitude towards skeptical philosophy. 
Where Descartes writes on the subject in his correspondence, it is usually within a context in 
which the main topic of exchange is not skepticism but other aspects of his work. In some of these 
letters, Descartes responds to specific questions asked of him and objections made against arguments 
in his published works, whereas in others he defends himself for what he thought were unfair or 
slanderous charges brought against him. As a result, in some of his letters Descartes’ tone is cordial 
whereas in others it seems guarded or even antagonistic. Readers of the correspondence can gauge 
distinct differences in attitudes and personal likes or dislikes between Descartes and his 
correspondents. With regard to our understanding of Descartes’ views on skepticism, these 
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differences are significant. In most of the correspondence where skepticism is mentioned, whether 
Descartes is writing to a friend or foe, there is consistency in Descartes’ judgments: his opinions 
about skepticism are consistently negative. 
To get a sense of the contrast in attitudes just mentioned, take one example: two letters that 
show two different sides of Descartes. The first of these letters is from May of 1637 and was written 
by Descartes in response to his friend, Jean de Silhon. Descartes begins his message with 
acknowledgement and agreement: “I agree, as you observe, that there is a great defect in the work 
you have seen, and that I have not expounded, in a manner that everyone can easily grasp, the 
arguments by which I claim to prove that there is nothing at all more evident and certain than the 
existence of God and the human soul.” (Descartes 1991, 55) Descartes answers Silhon’s questions 
by providing an explanation as to why, in the recently published Discourse on Method, he did not 
more clearly explain to the reader the arguments that demonstrate God’s existence and the existence 
of the human soul. “I did not dare to do so,” Descartes says, “since I would have had to explain at 
length the strongest arguments of the sceptics to show that there is no material thing of whose 
existence one can be certain.” (Descartes 1991, 55) Descartes closes his relatively brief letter to Silhon, 
“As for intelligent people like yourself…they will come to the same conclusions as I did. I shall be 
glad, as soon as I have time, to try to explain this further. I am pleased to have had this opportunity 
to show you that I am, etc.” (Descartes 1991, 56) It seems plain enough from the tone of this letter 
that there is a feeling of mutual respect and a sense of civility between Descartes and Silhon. 
However, such professional courtesy cannot be observed in the letter from Descartes to 
Voetius from May of 1643. In this letter, Descartes seems clearly offended by his correspondent. At 
the start of it, he says, “Even if the philosophy at which you rail were unsound, which you have failed 
to show at any point, and never will manage to show, what vice could it possibly be imagined to 
contain great enough to require its author to be slandered with such atrocious insults?” (Descartes 
1991, 220) Cordiality and mutual respect are nonexistent. Instead there is a sense of indignation on 
Descartes’ part brought on by the belief that Voetius had made insulting remarks about him and 
inaccurate statements about his work. 
The contrast in attitudes that comes across in this example is to some extent indicative of 
Descartes’ correspondence in general. Because of such interpersonal differences between Descartes 
and his correspondents—his friendliness with some and defensiveness towards others—and, even 
more so, the consistency in his opinions about skepticism nonetheless, I would argue that the 
correspondence provides us with an authentic representation of Descartes’ views on skepticism. The 
correspondence as is presents a more realistic picture of Descartes’ opinions on skepticism than we 
would have, for instance, if all of his correspondents were well-liked colleagues.  
 
On the Pyrrhonists, the Skeptics, and Skepticism 
In the letters where Descartes shares his opinions about the Pyrrhonists and the skeptics, he 
does so by describing such philosophers as ineffective, disingenuous, or heretical. Judgments like 
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these provide clear indications that Descartes did not view skeptical philosophy in a positive light. 
We can get a sense of Descartes’ disdain for the skeptics’ way of life from what he says about them in 
the Reply to the Fifth Set of Objections to the Meditations. “For when it is a question of organizing 
our life,” he says, “it would, of course, be foolish not to trust the senses, and the sceptics who 
neglected human affairs to the point where friends had to stop them falling of precipices deserved to 
be laughed at.” (Descartes 1984–1985, 243) Descartes seems to be referencing the stories told not 
only about the Pyrrhonian skeptics but also about Pyrrho, the de facto founder of Pyrrhonism. In 
the Lives of Eminent Philosophers, which was written sometime between the second and fourth 
centuries A.D., Diogenes Laertius describes Pyrrho as having led his life in the following manner: 
“going out of his way for nothing, taking no precaution, but facing all risks as they came, whether 
carts, precipices, dogs or what not, and, generally, leaving nothing to the arbitrament of the senses; 
but he was kept out of harm’s way by his friends who…used to follow close after him.” (Diogenes 
1995, 475) Descartes could not see the virtue in both choosing not to trust the senses and deliberately 
adhering to no beliefs in the course of one’s practical life. He did not find anything laudable about 
this way of life. In fact, Descartes thought that the Pyrrhonian skeptics should be mocked for 
behaving in the ways described.  
In a letter to Reneri for Pollot, from April or May of 1638, Descartes answers questions and 
responds to criticisms about his recently published Discourse, a text in which he showed nascent signs 
of the hyperbolic doubt that was to come later in the First Meditation. In part of his response to 
Reneri, Descartes criticizes the Pyrrhonists for perpetually doubting and, as a result, never arriving 
at any certainty. For Descartes, to be constantly lacking in certain knowledge akin to the Pyrrhonists 
would not be a state of affairs to be content with but rather an obvious reason to aspire to knowledge. 
However, “although the Pyrrhonists reached no certain conclusions from their doubts,” Descartes 
says, “it does not follow that no one can.” (Descartes 1991, 99) In the Second Meditation, after 
implementing his skeptical method and reflecting on his agonizing doubts, he presses on: “Great 
things are…to be hoped for if I succeed in finding just one thing, however slight, that is certain and 
unshaken.” (Descartes 2006, 13) Descartes was after certain knowledge in philosophy and the 
sciences, and he recognized that Pyrrhonian or skeptical doubt could be strategically used and 
presented to support his claims to such knowledge. 
In the same letter to Reneri from 1638, Descartes continues along these lines by suggesting 
that Pyrrhonism (which, according to him, is primarily characterized by doubting everything) might 
in fact be used to arrive at certain knowledge. He says, “I would try now to show how these doubts 
[of the Pyrrhonists] can be used to prove God’s existence.” (Descartes 1991, 99) In this letter, then, 
Descartes indicates what would later appear in the Meditations, where he indeed uses Pyrrhonian or 
skeptical arguments—in conjunction with his method of hyperbolic doubt—to support his 
demonstrations of the existence of the soul, God, and the material world. 
To return to the letter to Hyperaspistes from August of 1641: in addition to characterizing 
the skeptics as disingenuous, Descartes implies that they are atheistic and describes them as heretical. 
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The skeptics, according to Descartes, “would not have doubted the truths of geometry if they had 
duly recognized God, because since those geometrical truths are very clear, they would have had no 
occasion to doubt them if they had known that whatever is clearly understood is true.” (Descartes 
1991, 196) Yet, according to Descartes, such skeptics did in fact doubt obviously true propositions, 
including geometrical demonstrations, “even though they clearly understood them.” (Descartes 
1991, 196) Thus, Descartes concludes, “It is only in name, and perhaps in intention and resolve, that 
they adhere to the heresy of doubting everything.” (Descartes 1991, 196–197) 
In the previously referenced letter to Voetius from May of 1643, Descartes points out the 
faulty reasoning of those skeptics who would deny the self-evident cogito: 
 
You deny that anyone can rightly conclude, from the fact that he is thinking, that he exists; 
for you want the sceptic to conclude merely that he seems to himself to exist – as if anyone using 
his reason, however sceptical he might be, could seem to himself to exist without at the same 
time understanding that he really exists, whenever this seems to him to be the case. Thus you 
deny what is the most evident proposition there could possibly be in any science. (Descartes 
1991, 222)  
 
In this passage, Descartes points to a generally accepted and well-known characteristic of the 
Pyrrhonian skeptics: their willingness to state how things seem to them (or what is apparent to them) 
but their unwillingness to make claims about reality. In the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus puts it 
this way: “What [the Sceptics] investigate is not what is apparent but what is said about what is 
apparent.” (Sextus 2000, 8) For instance, the Pyrrhonian skeptics would not deny that sunlight 
seems to give warmth. What they disputed were claims that the dogmatists would make as a result of 
that apparent warmth—for example, the claim that the sun actually does possess, produce, and 
provide heat or warmth. Descartes implies that such reasoning, when it concerns the question of 
one’s own existence, is self-deceptive, disingenuous, inane, impossible, or all of the above. No one 
can honestly say to himself, “I seem to exist,” without admitting that, in fact, he necessarily exists. 
This selection from the letter to Voetius, then, provides clear evidence of Descartes’ dismissive 
attitude towards skeptical philosophy. 
In a letter to Chanut from November 1, 1646, Descartes expresses his extreme dissatisfaction 
with critics who misinterpret his work and slander him. He laments the fact that “a certain Father 
Bourdin thought he had good reason to accuse me of being a sceptic, because I refuted the sceptics.” 
(Descartes 1991, 299) In this letter, Descartes suggests that having his words twisted by people like 
Bourdin has given him enough reason to stop publishing his works altogether. “The best thing I can 
do henceforth is to abstain from writing books,” he says. “I shall pursue my studies only for my own 
instruction, and communicate my thoughts only to those with whom I can converse privately.” 
(Descartes 1991, 300) Based on such remarks about the skeptics in his correspondence, we can see 
that Descartes expresses his desire not to be associated with them. Descartes denies that he is a skeptic, 
and he explains why his particular use of skeptical reasoning absolves him from the charge of being 
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a skeptic. In addition, Descartes’ statements on the subject in the correspondence reveal his slighting 
views of—and his contempt for—skepticism. 
 
On the Use of Doubt 
I have drawn attention to the judgments about skepticism and the skeptics that Descartes 
expresses in his correspondence. At this point it should be fairly clear that Descartes disapproved of 
skeptical philosophy. He held negative views about the skeptics, believing them to be disingenuous, 
ineffectual, foolish, and even heretical. As far as I can tell, Descartes has not written a single word 
about skepticism or the skeptics to suggest any kind of approbation on his part. However, unlike his 
opinions about skepticism, his views on the use of doubt are not so one-sided or straightforward. 
As previously discussed, one of Descartes’ views about the skeptics is that they primarily doubt 
everything—even those things like the self-evident certainty of the cogito for which, according to 
him, doubt would be inconceivable. However, Descartes does utilize doubt in his published works, 
and in the Meditations he even presents an extreme form of hyperbolic doubt through the malicious 
demon hypothesis. What Descartes says in the correspondence about his use of doubt reflects the 
fact that although he looked down on the skeptics for incessantly doubting everything, he recognized 
the value of using doubt strategically.  
The correspondence that best presents Descartes’ opinions about what he considers to be the 
proper use of doubt is his letter to Buitendijck from 1643. In this letter, Descartes responds to a 
question regarding “whether it is ever permissible to doubt about God.” (Descartes 2000, 212) 
Descartes explains how the answer to this question would depend upon one’s reasons for doubting. 
“For if someone takes as his aim to doubt about God in order to persist in this doubt,” Descartes 
says, “he is sinning gravely since he wishes to remain in doubt on a topic of such importance. But if 
someone proposes to himself doubt as a means to pursuing a clearer knowledge of truth, he is doing 
something altogether pious and worthy, since no one can wish the end without also wishing the 
means.” (Descartes 2000, 212) In this part of the letter, Descartes implicitly refers to the skeptics. 
Though many of those who were of a skeptical bent would disagree with his characterization of 
them, Descartes’ view of the skeptics is that they doubt “merely for the sake of doubting.” (Descartes 
2000, 59) Unlike the skeptics, who “sin gravely” by doubting in their particular manner, Descartes 
claims to be using doubt in the Meditations and other published works for a noble purpose: to seek 
and attain “knowledge of truth.” According to Descartes, the motivations or intentions behind one’s 
doubt are highly significant factors that must be considered in order to determine whether or not 
the use of doubt is permissible. 
Descartes responds to another question posed by Buitendijck concerning “whether it is ever 
permissible to assume something false in matters that concern God.” (Descartes 2000, 212) This 
question contains an implicit reference to the malicious demon hypothesis from the First 
Meditation. In the First Meditation, Descartes supposes “not a supremely good God, the source of 
truth, but rather an evil genius, supremely powerful and clever…has directed his entire effort at 
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deceiving me.” (Descartes 2006, 12) In response to the question about the permissibility of positing 
the possible existence of an evil genius or a malicious demon, Descartes says this:  
 
A person who invents a deceiving God (or even the true God, but not yet clearly enough 
known to himself or to others, for whose sake he is setting up his hypothesis) and who is not 
misusing this fiction for a bad purpose, in order to persuade others of something false 
concerning the diving power, but only in order to better illuminate his intellect, so that he 
may come to a better knowledge of God or show him more clearly to others, such a man, I say, 
is not really sinning, but acting so that good may come. For there is no malice in this; he is 
rather doing something absolutely good, and he cannot be reproached for this, except by 
slander. (Descartes 2000, 213) 
 
We can see that Descartes provides a similar answer to the question about inventing a 
deceiving God as the one he gives in response to the question about doubting God’s existence. To 
fabricate a false, deceptive, or malicious God would be acceptable as long as the purpose in doing so 
was noble: to increase one’s knowledge and to know God better. Descartes defends his unique use 
of skeptical doubt because he doubts as a means rather than as an end. “We must make a distinction,” 
Descartes says, “between doubt as an end, and doubt as a means.” (Descartes 1991, 229) According 
to Descartes, the skeptics pursue and use doubt as an end in itself—they doubt “merely for the sake 
of doubting”—which is foolish and ineffectual because it keeps them in a state of uncertainty (or 
the appearance of a state of uncertainty). (Descartes 2000, 59) However, as a means, Descartes would 
gladly utilize skeptical doubt in order to show how certain knowledge can be attained and, as a result, 
that such doubt is unfounded. Just as the motivations for doubting must be examined in order to 
determine whether or not the use of doubt is permissible, so the recognition that doubt should only 
be used as a means and never as an end is equally important. 
 In a letter to Princess Elizabeth from May 10, 1647, Descartes expresses more than a little 
disconcertment over charges of atheism and heresy brought against him for his use of doubt in the 
Meditations. Descartes seems especially troubled by one theologian in particular, Jacobus Revius, 
who had been spreading inaccurate interpretations of his work: Revius would “make people believe 
that I said some things in [the Meditations] which are quite absurd and are contrary to the glory of 
God – for example, that we must doubt that there is a God. He would even have it that I want people 
to deny absolutely for a while that there is a God, and things of that sort.” (Descartes 1991, 317) 
Descartes’ response to Revius’ accusations indicates that his use of doubt in the Meditations, though 
strategic, is not sincere. The doubting of God’s existence is not necessary for Descartes, and it is 
certainly not advised. Nor is Descartes’ doubt meant to be taken seriously. To genuinely doubt or 
deny God’s existence, according to Descartes, would indeed be “contrary to the glory of God” and 
is not what Descartes intends for his readers to do. Rather, Descartes’ use of doubt in the 
Meditations is meant to show his readers how following exaggerated or hyperbolic doubt eventually 
reveals the absurdity of such doubt. 




In this paper, I have explained my interpretation of Descartes’ association with skepticism. By 
beginning with a discussion of the similarities between the writings of Montaigne, Sextus Empiricus, 
and Cicero, on the one hand, and the Discourse on Method, Descartes’ first published work, on the 
other, I have shown that Descartes was influenced by skeptical ideas. However, although he was 
influenced by skepticism, on the whole he regards the skeptics with contempt. In his 
correspondence, Descartes trounces the skeptics for their inanity and disingenuousness. He calls 
them heretical for constantly doubting everything even when it would be absurd and impious to do 
so. Yet, Descartes also recognizes the value of using doubt as a means rather than an end. His use of 
doubt in his published works is strategic.  
The things that Descartes doubts, at least insofar as the way in which his doubts are presented 
in his published works—for example, the way in which he appears to be uncertain about whether or 
not we are awake—are not things that are actually doubted by Descartes. In a letter to Mersenne 
from October 16, 1639, Descartes says, “For my part, I have never had any doubts about truth, 
because it seems a notion so transcendentally clear that nobody can be ignorant of it.” (Descartes 
1991, 139) If there were no need to doubt things that are obviously true, such as the certainty of our 
own existence, then why would Descartes utilize doubt in his published works? I suggest that the 
kind of doubt Descartes presents in his published works helps him to reveal the self-evident certainty 
of such truths as the cogito, particularly for those readers who find it difficult to realize those 
“transcendentally clear” truths. In the same letter to Mersenne, Descartes says that his criterion of 
truth is the “natural light,” and that although everyone has this natural light, “hardly anyone makes 
good use of that light, so that many people – perhaps all those we know – may share the same 
mistaken opinion. Also,” Descartes continues, “there are many things which can be known by the 
natural light, but which no one has yet reflected on.” (Descartes 1991, 139) In a letter to Colvius 
from November 14, 1640, Descartes says, “In itself it is such a simple and natural thing to infer that 
one exists from the fact that one is doubting.” (Descartes 1991, 159) Yet, most people do not reflect 
on this truth. Descartes’ method of doubt, then, is presented for the benefit of his readers—for their 
instruction—so that through such a method they may better realize the truths that are, or should 
already be, so plain to them: that they are thinking things who necessarily exist, and that God exists 
and is not a deceiver. 
Unfortunately for Descartes, his use of doubt caused some of his contemporaries, including 
Pierre Bourdin, to peg him as a skeptic. Whether we describe skepticism according to Descartes’ one-
sided characterization or understand that tradition more comprehensively and accurately, it is clear 
that Descartes was not a skeptic. Not only was he not a skeptic, but in the correspondence he also 
makes it clear that he is fundamentally opposed to skeptical philosophy. Descartes derided the 
skeptics and attempted to distance himself from any association with them because he thought that 
his motivations were quite different from theirs, and more admirable. Whereas the skeptics were 
constantly in doubt, Descartes was not. The Pyrrhonian and Academic skeptics may have denied 
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that they had access to certain knowledge about reality, but Descartes both sought after such 
knowledge and claimed to have attained it. 
 
Endnotes: 
1.  See Montaigne 2003. Included among Montaigne’s essays are To philosophize is to learn how to die, On 
virtue, Observations on Julius Caesar’s methods of waging war, and On three good wives. 
2.  There are only two places in the correspondence that I know of where Descartes mentions Montaigne   
by name, both of which are in a letter to the Marquess of Newcastle, from November 23, 1646, and 
deal with claims about human and animal intelligence. Descartes explains his disagreement with the 
“opinion of Montaigne and others who attribute understanding or thought to animals.” (Descartes 
1991, 302) Later he says, “Montaigne and Charron may have said that there is a greater difference 
between one human being and another than between a human being and an animal; yet there has never 
been known an animal so perfect as to use a sign to make other animals understand something which 
bore no relation to its passions; and there is no human being so imperfect as not to do so, since even 
deaf-mutes invent special signs to express their thoughts.” (Descartes 1991, 303) 
3.  On the skeptical modes, see Sextus 2000, 11–46. 
4.  See Descartes 2006: “I find within myself two distinct ideas of the sun. One idea is drawn, as it were, 
from the senses…By means of this idea the sun appears to me to be quite small. But there is another 
idea, one derived from astronomical reasoning…through this idea the sun is shown to be several times 
larger than the earth. Both ideas surely cannot resemble the same sun existing outside me; and reason 
convinces me that the idea that seems to have emanated from the sun itself from so close is the very one 
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